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SPACE SHUTTLE ORBITAL FLIGHT TEST

Donald K. Slayton
Manager for Orbital Flight Test
NASA/Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas
ABSTRACT

again transfers back to the ground team for postfI ight power down, cleanup, and transfer back to
the Cape to begin recycling for the follow-on
flight.
The ground team ! s role also includes
trouble shooting as required of inflight anomalies,
correction of these anomalies, and implementation
of whatever modifications were deemed necessary
between flights. At this point in time, preparing
for a first flight also includes completion of much
deferred manufacturing which is more expeditious
and economical to accornpl ish here at the Cape than
at the manufacturing facility in Palmdale.

This paper will review current plans for the over
all Orbital Flight Test Program. Discussion will
include vehicle configurations, flight test pro
gression logic, schedules, pay loads, and anticipa
ted placards on early operational missions. STS-1
flight plan will be covered in some detail; also,
the functional organization and procedures planned
to conduct the test program will be reviewed.
INTRODUCTION

Another major element of the flight test organiza
tion is the test evaluation team, which is respon
sible for procurement of the flight test data and
analysis of it, and a determination of how well the
flight test requirements were met. One of the pro
ducts of their reference is the final mission re
port and another is the feed-in to the mission
planning group, which is the other major element,
so that whatever was not properly accomplished can
be rescheduled into later f I igh-ts. As usual, this
will be a combination of picking up missed test
points, plus amplification of others where we were
not as smart as we thought we were preflight.

This paper will discuss the Operational Flight Test
Program of the Space Shuttle, the organization
which will conduct the test, and some level of de
tail on the series of flights, concentrating pri
marily on the first flight which is most well de
fined.

DISCUSSION
In the OFT functional organization the Manager for
Orbital Flight Test works directly for the Shuttle
Program Manager. He has no staff assigned directly
to him, but rather draws on the resources of the
total organization and directs a task force in a
similar fashion to the Approach and Landing Tests,
conducted at Dryden about two years ago.
Here are four key elements of the so called in-line
organization. The first being the launch director
and the launch team.
This is almost totally
Kennedy with their supporting contractors. Their
function, as usual, is the total checkout of the
vehicle, the preparation for flight up through the
final countdown lift-off, and up through tower
clear. At this point, mission control transfers to
the flight control team and the flight directors,
who control the missions in real time throughout
the remainder of the launch, on-orbit, and
re-entry.
Upon completion of roll out, control

The rest of the organization is staff, which is in
direct support of these four major line elements.
We have a technical assistant for fI ight testing
who integrates the inputs and outputs of the test
evaluation and mission planning managers. The re
maining elements are representative of the major
program elements.
These obviously include the
Orbiter, the ET, the SRB, the SSME, the Cape opera
tions, crew GFE, and the overall integration func
tion. The prime purpose of these gentlemen is to
provide an interface between the launch director,
who is preparing the vehicle for flight, and the
major program elements, who are responsible for
maintaining configuration control and doing the
necessary engineering and design to correct
anomalies or safety issues. These representatives
form the nucleus of the configuration control
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system, and are responsible for working changes
related to their systems back through the parent
Center engineering elements and into the supporting
They are also
contractor engineering elements.
responsible for providing visibility on proposed
These are primarily representatives of
changes.
the users who must be in a position to evaluate the
impact of hardware changes on flight crew proce
dures, flight control procedures, control center
configuration, etc.
Theoretically, our changes to the vehicle at this
point in the program are only those which are re
quired to make it work or those required due to
safety. Therefore, we should have no issue with
whether a change must be made, but are primarily
concerned that there is adequate visibility across
the system to assess the impact and have all ele
ments properly prepared to cope with the new con
figuration.
We are presently showing six flights in the Flight
Test Program, which was a rather arbitrary number
selected some years ago but is still approximately
correct. We are working to complete most of the
objectives in the first five flights with the in
tent of retaining the sixth as a contingency. As
with most test programs, the crossover point from
flight test to operations is not a clean line.
Ideally, we would deliver to the operations organi
zations a vehicle fully qualified and unplacarded
In the real world we
at the end of six flights.
realize there are a number of areas wherein we will
our capabilities
verified
or
demonstrated
not have
to spec values. We think we know where most of
to pick up this
plan
a
have
we
and
these are now
additional data in a parallel with the operational
no impact.
or
minimum
with
program, hopefully
There are four basic drivers which define the num
ber of flights necessary in the program. The first
of these is the launch environment which we have
defined as limiting launch Q. We have elected to
step up in increments from 550 to 650 with a design
goal of not planning to exceed 650 but being pre
pared to accept the spec value of 817 in contingen
cies. Therefore, this part of the fI ight program
can be done in three to four fI ights.
The next major driver is on-orbit operations.
There are a multitude of systems flight test re
quirements which must be completed. A major one,
of course, is operation of the pay load bay doors on
the first flight. However, the real driver here is
the thermal balance of the systems at varying
We will not
launch inclinations and sun angles.
get to the highest incl inations desired by the

thermal folks so there will be some data points
here necessarily picked up during the operations
Fortunately, the first requirement for
program.
high beta or sun angles occurs quite far into the
operations program and those data points can be
picked up when the need occurs.
The other two program drivers are related to re
entry. The first Is re-entry thermal which ends up
being a by-product of the re-entry aero; so aero Is
really the prime driver here and, In fact, for the
whole program. CG is very critical to entry direc
tional control and stability around the Mach 3 to 4
region and we are trying to work our way into this
region on a very gradual basis. The first flight
will be flown at CG of 66.7 and we will move for
ward in small increments throughout the duration of
the OFT Program. However, in order to expand the
full payload envelope, it will require approxi
mately nine flights under the current plan. There
fore, this ends up being the real long pole in the
OFT Program and we intend to carry the necessary
instrumentation on into the operations program to
allow expansion of the CG with minimal impact on
the operations. Hopefully, we will have demonstra
ted an envelope that is adequate for most planned
payloads at this time.
Our presently planned flight numbers and launch
dates are optimistic, but we believe they are
There are several launch
doable at this time.
inclinations for the various flights. We have one
at 40-1/2 degrees that is driven primarily by a de
sire to keep the debris from the external tank
clear of all land masses. This particular angle
drives us south of the Australian land mass; where
as, the earlier planned 38 degrees would have
allowed an impact, assuming our dispersions were
greater than predicted. Launch altitudes are all
approximately the same. We launch all our flights
from KSC at Cape Canaveral, and plan to recover the
first four at DFRC on the dry lake bed at Edwards
Air Force Base, and the final two on the runway at
Cape Canaveral .
Our test instrumentation remains constant across
the program. DFIs are Development Flight Instru
mentation, the IECM is an instrument for environ
mental control monitoring of the payload bay, and
the AC IP is the aerodynamic coefficient Instrumen
tation package. That package, plus a smaller DFI
package, will be carried on into the operations
We think the mini-DFI will carry about
program.
1,000 instrumentation points into the operations
program and we will be able to obtain all the
carryover flight test data from OFT, plus the testIng peculiar to various payloads.
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we expect constant iterations on the
fine details of the above described program, but
anticipate the major elements remaining relatively
stable barring major unforseen problems.

NOMENCLATURE
STS-1 - Space Transportation System
ET - External Tank
SRB - Sol id Rocket Booster
SSME - Space Shuttle Main Engines
Crew GFE - Government Furnished Equipment
PJR - plight Test Requirements
DFRC - Dryden Flight Research Center
KSC - Kennedy Space Center
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